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21ST CENTURY SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY:  
REFLECTIONS ON THE “NEW METAPHYSICS” 





ABSTRACT: Regarding the state of contemporary metaphysics, as it has been said, “There’s 
something in the air.”1  My goal in this essay is to offer some brief reflections on the state of 
contemporary metaphysics, otherwise called contemporary “speculative” philosophy – the 
“something in the air” – that has resurfaced within the early part of the 21st century.  In order 
to clarify the nature of the new metaphysics in question I proceed by isolating geographically and 
topically two main tendencies of thought which appear to constitute it: namely continental realism 
and continental materialism.2  I argue that clarifying the nature of these tendencies better 
characterizes what metaphysics means today.  With respect to the possible ambiguity of 
“continental realism” or “continental materialism” in the 21st century, a consideration of 
“speculative realism” seems necessary if only to position my analysis upon a specific conceptual 
map.  From there I offer thoughts as to how contemporary continental realism and materialism 
(the “new metaphysics”) may be said to be defined first and foremost by its engagement with a 
concept identified as “correlationism,” a central feature of the new metaphysics’ rejection of the 
sort of philosophy that has come before it. 
1 Patrice Maniglier, “Metaphysics Today: The Methodological Controversy,” Presentation celebrating the 90th 
anniversary of Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), Multimedia Institute and Institut Français: Zagreb, (June 
2012), series MétaphysiqueS. 
2 The term “continental” may be misleading here, however the new metaphysics in question, while mostly 
part of a phenomenon that has stemmed from Europe (Germany and France), is nevertheless in dialogue 
with a much larger Anglo-American tradition, as well as a historical tradition whose geographical borders 
are porous.  Yet, if there were one “history” or “tradition” of idiom and conceptual structure within and 
through which the new metaphysics proceeds, it would be the “continental” tradition first and foremost, 
i.e. post-Kantian philosophers such as Deleuze, Derrida, Heidegger, Badiou – even if the new 
metaphysics in many cases sets itself against these figures polemically by pragmatically appropriating 
resources from competing traditions.  “Continental realism is a middle path that accepts, contra 
traditionalist continental philosophy, that the natural sciences, realism, and analytic philosophy are not a 
threat, but aids in the task of first science: metaphysics.”  Paul Ennis, Continental Realism (Winchester, UK: 
Zero Books, 2011), preface. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
“Speculative realism" was a term originally coined by the philosopher Raymond 
Brassier (b. 1965), author of Nihil Unbound (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).3  It 
was essentially used to describe a broad array of topics in metaphysics which were 
under discussion at a conference titled “Speculative Realism,” held at the Goldsmiths 
College, University of London in April of 2007.4  Earlier, however, the French 
philosopher Quentin Meillassoux (b. 1967) used the term "speculative materialism" to 
describe his own position which would later be expounded upon in his momentous 
After Finitude (trans. Ray Brassier, London and New York: Continuum 2008).5  In 
recent times, the term has fanned out to include what is now generally perceived as a 
certain “spirit” of speculation animating a "new metaphysics” or a “new materialism,” 
where such positions comprise contemporary realism and materialism in the 21st 
century.6  This new “spirit” may be described as a “speculative turn” which occurred 
after continental philosophy’s late 20th century “theological turn.”7  
3 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007). 
4 See Collapse III: Unknown Deleuze + Speculative Realism, ed. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 
2007). 
5 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude, trans. Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), also Quentin 
Meillassoux, “L'inexistence divine. Essai sur le Dieu virtuel,” Thèse de doctorat, École normale 
supériuere, 1997. 
6 As Jussi Parikka notes, despite the current enthusiasm for “neo-materialism” or the “new materialism,” 
the term “neo-materialism” was first employed in the early 1990s by Rosi Braidotti, well before its re-
appearance in the first part of the decade in the twenty first century.  See 
http://jussiparikka.net/2013/05/13/new-materialisms-round-four/, retrieved July 23, 2013. 
7 The “speculative turn” is largely credited with the Goldsmith’s conference, however it is true that 
continental philosophy has had a longstanding interest in metaphysics despite recent critiques (someone 
such as Deleuze would be a recent philosopher who emphasizes metaphysics, for example). A dated but 
fine engagement with speculative philosophy which accounts for this historical lineage can be found in 
Andrew Reck, Speculative Philosophy: A Study of its nature, types, and uses (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1972).  This volume traces the historical antecedents of speculative philosophy and leads up 
to the middle of the twentieth-century. It may serve as a historical “go-by” for those seeking an overview 
of the history of speculative philosophy and indicate how the “turn” to speculative philosophy owes much 
to a history of both continental and Anglo-American metaphysics.  I would also suggest Lee Braver, A 
Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2007) 
and Ian James, The New French Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2012) for contemporary perspective on the 
debate.  American philosophy, a much younger style and domain of philosophy distinct from the 
continental tradition, has always been speculative as much as it has been grounded in the concrete and 
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The central themes of this new current of philosophy could be summarized rather 
tersely, although the philosophical implications taken therefrom are far reaching. The 
themes, simply put, are materialism, realism, and metaphysics.8  While the term 
"speculative realism" specifically is now less frequently used due to the controversy 
surrounding what it actually means (no one philosopher appears to self-identify with 
the term “speculative realist” as such), “speculative realism” can be used as an initial 
marker “of sorts” in order to describe tendencies of thought whose concerns remain tied to 
materialism, realism, and metaphysics in a specific sense. (This sense, I would argue, 
may be analogous to using the term "postmodernism” in order to mark off general 
tendencies or shared points of concern which then may be distilled down to specific 
themes: for example, moving from the broader category of “postmodernism” to the 
more specific category of "deconstructionism.”)  Although that clarifying usage of 
“speculative realism,” too, is becoming less frequent as the boundaries of the term 
dissipate.  Still, in its short five or six year history, if I were absolutely pressed to 
summarize it, the spirit animating “speculative realism” could be compared to a 
remark that I once heard concerning the best of German idealism: it was an 
astonishing but brief flare in the night.9 
“pragmatic.”  Metaphysics is not uncommon to the likes of Peirce, James, and Dewey, who all strive to 
show how the practical and theoretical are one.  See Sandra B. Rosenthal, Speculative Pragmatism (LaSalle, 
Illinois: Open Court, 1990).  Interestingly, figures often associated with the revival of metaphysics in 
Europe, including Bruno Latour, Philippe Descola, and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, cite James and 
Dewey as significant influences. 
8 I believe that there is a good consensus that these three items could serve as uniting points for this new 
version of speculative philosophy.  I am drawing from the generally positive reception of a recent 
conference held at the Freie Universitat of Berlin in 2012, "Contemporary Materialism, Realism, and 
Metaphysics," organized by Armen Avanessian and Tobias Huber. See: 
http://www.sfb626.de/veranstaltungen/veranstaltungsarchiv/workshops/sfb626_workshop_Contempor
ary_Materialism_3.html. 
9 My goal here is not to debate the “existence” of speculative realism but rather to simply state that the 
term’s meaning is, at best, ambiguous and not a popular label that contemporary philosophers self-
identify with.  Only one book that is exclusively about “speculative realism” has been published in the half 
decade that has passed since the first Speculative Realism conference: Peter Gratton’s Speculative Realism: 
Problems and Prospects (London & New York: Continuum, 2013).  It may be safer to say, as Iain Hamilton 
Grant has, that “speculative realism” at best can, at times, substitute as an “umbrella term” in order to 
describe specific metaphysical concerns - concerns that were initially presented at a conference having the 
name “Speculative Realism.”  Today those concerns have been taken up by numerous philosophers – 
mostly in the continental tradition although not exclusive to it - who have a renewed interest in 
metaphysics.  See, Iain Hamilton Grant, “Speculative realism,” The Philosophers' Magazine, 50 (3) 2010: 58-
9.  It is worth noting that Grant, as well as Brassier, were among the original four conference participants.  
Brassier’s take on speculative realism may be more harsh than Grant’s, but is fairly accurate in my 
opinion: "The ‘speculative realist movement’ exists only in the imaginations of a group of bloggers 
promoting an agenda for which I have no sympathy whatsoever: actor-network theory spiced with pan-
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As Meillassoux (the most prominent figure of speculative realism) is from France 
though, and setting German idealism aside for the moment, European continental 
philosophy has had a longstanding relationship with French philosophers who have 
largely dominated what continental philosophy means, especially when it comes to 
attitudes concerning metaphysics.10  Today, the speculative spirit figures into 
contemporary continental philosophy positively such that philosophers including 
François Laruelle and his "non-standard philosophy" (Brassier was among the first of 
the speculative philosophers with an interest in Laruelle), Bruno Latour (responsible 
for the creation of a school of thought known as “actor-network theory,” responsible as 
well as for a recrudescence of interest in science and technology studies, philosophical 
anthropology, and sociology among continental circles), and Catherine Malabou 
(responsible for a corresponding resurgence in new forms of materialism and 
neurobiology) have all received significant attention in France where they all, also, 
represent the new metaphysics underway.11  Also in France, the new metaphysics is 
shaped by the CIEPFC organization, headed by Quentin Meillassoux, Frédéric 
psychist metaphysics and morsels of process philosophy. I don’t believe the internet is an appropriate 
medium for serious philosophical debate; nor do I believe it is acceptable to try to concoct a philosophical 
movement online by using blogs to exploit the misguided enthusiasm of impressionable graduate students. 
I agree with Deleuze’s remark that ultimately the most basic task of philosophy is to impede stupidity, so I 
see little philosophical merit in a ‘movement’ whose most signal achievement thus far is to have generated 
an online orgy of stupidity."  Interview with Ray Brassier, “I am a Nihilist Because I Still Believe in 
Truth,” Kronos (March, 2011). 
10 Alain Badiou, The Adventure of French Philosophy (London and New York: Verso, 2012).  It must be noted 
here as well that continental philosophy is often pitted against “analytic” philosophy, however this 
distinction, too, is appearing to dissipate in the approach of the new metaphysical philosophy in question.  
A “hybrid” form of metaphysics has appeared in the sense that many of the analytical pragmatists 
(Brandom, Sellars) are included in the conversation as much as Heidegger and Deleuze are.  Others from 
traditions that are neither explicitly continental or analytic (the American process tradition, for example) 
including Whitehead and Peirce, have made their way into the conversation vis-à-vis contemporary 
philosophers on both sides of the analytic and continental divide.  Two examples that immediately come 
to mind are Steven Shaviro’s Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze and Aesthetics (MIT 2009) and 
Brassier’s ‘Badiou and Science’ in Alain Badiou: Key Concepts, A. J. Bartlett and J. Clemens eds., (Chesholm: 
Acumen, 2010).   
11 The output of all three philosophers: Laruelle, Latour, and Malabou is enormous, but I would certainly 
suggest from Laruelle: Philosophies of Difference: A Critical Introduction to Non-Philosophy, trans. Rocco Gangle 
(New York, Continuum 2010), The Non-Philosophy Project: Essays by François Laruelle, ed. Gabriel Alkon (New 
York: Telos, 2012); and from Latour: An Inquiry into the Modes of Existence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), and We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); 
and from Malabou: The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, Dialectic (New York: Routledge, 2004); and 
What Should We Do with Our Brain? (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008).   
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Worms, Élie During, and Patrice Maniglier. Its members are in charge of the 
MétaphysiqueS collection at Presses Universitares de France, whose major publications 
include works by Etienne Souriau, Viveiro de Castro, and an essay on Whitehead by 
Pierre Cassou Noguès.12  Many of these developments have been traced and 
expounded upon by Alexander Galloway, whose book Les Nouveaux réalistes : C. 
Malabou, B. Stiegler, M. Belhaj Kacem, Q. Meillassoux, F. Laruelle  (Léo Scheer, 2012), serves 
as a critical benchmark.13 
If naming personages were required, then one may perhaps go further out and yet 
still capture a meaningful flavor of dialogue happening by mentioning Martin Hägglund (a 
Swedish born philosophical materialist teaching at Yale University), Adrian Johnston 
(another prominent materialist philosopher working in the United States who is also 
critical of the recent continental tradition), or even Slavoj Žižek, whose own 
materialism is probably among the most discussed, yet his position could not be 
described as "speculative" or as a "realism" per se (it is certainly a materialism).14  I must 
also not neglect to mention an English philosopher, Iain Hamilton Grant, whose own 
speculative philosophy draws upon the German philosopher, Friedrich Schelling.  
Grant has written one book on Schelling, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (London 
and New York: Continuum 2006) and his philosophy has become a reference point for 
those in the new metaphysics who rally behind what is known as “process philosophy,” 
a perspective which emphasizes the self-powering and vital nature of matter as well as 
matter’s own processual generative pre-conditions.15  
12 This is the most active place, to my knowledge, of metaphysical developments in France. Of note also is 
the Club de la Montagne Sainte-Geneviève, directed by Martin Fortier.  For a recent French “scene” 
report see:http://www.afterxnature.blogspot.com/2013/10/louis-morelle-french-scene-report.html 
Thanks to Louis Morelle for communicating the details of these affairs to me. 
13 Alexander Galloway,  Les Nouveaux réalistes : C. Malabou, B. Stiegler, M. Belhaj Kacem, Q. Meillassoux, F. 
Laruelle (Paris: Editions Leo Scheer, 2012).  See also Galloway’s “French Theory Today: An Introduction 
to Possible Futures,” a pamphlet series documenting the weeklong October 2012 seminar at the Public 
School New York (TPSNY/Erudio Editions 2010).  In English one may also wish to consult Ian James’ 
The New French Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity, 2012). 
14 See Martin Hagglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2008); Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Žižek, and Political Transformations: The Cadence of Change (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2009), Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism: The Outcome of Contemporary French 
Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2013),and Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist 
Theory of Finally Slavoj Žižek’s published body of works is simply astounding (he has authored as sole 
author three books in 2012 alone), but recent interest has centered on his equally astounding Less Than 
Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (London: Verso, 2012).   
15 Iain Hamilton Grant, Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (London and New York: Continuum, 2008).  
Philosophers who have rallied behind Grant’s approach could be considered by and large as accepting 
theses of what is known as “process philosophy.”  Whether this “process” camp of speculative philosophy 
is guilty of Meillassoux’s “subjectalist” critique is still open for debate, as these currents of thought are 
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Now, there are many, many others, too many to mention here, who could be 
named as having a connection with this new spirit of materialist and realist philosophy, 
and I would admit that the dimensions of materialism, realism, and metaphysics 
certainly casts a wide net.16 But I am certainly obliged to identify some conceptual 
compass and map to get us started at the very least.  Afterall, the ideas and theories in 
question are more important than specific names or labels, and while a specific term or 
title such as “speculative realism” may be useful to gain an entry point into 
understanding the spirit of a philosophy, relying flatly upon specific “name brands” or 
specific individuals can be downright harmful or even illusory – and so I hope that I 
have taken appropriate care here in using these labels.  If anything, “speculative 
realism” simply can be said to be an “umbrella term” for philosophies that “uphold the 
autonomy of reality” and which question the “correlationist consensus.” [emphases mine]17  It 
is upon this consensus that I would like to focus: namely, the concept of correlationism.18 
21st century metaphysics appears to either reject correlationism or deconstruct its 
history and return to it in a modified form (radicalizing it from within)19.  This is true for 
two reasons.  First, the radical “materialist” metaphysics under review here seeks to 
each very much in their own unique lines of development. While historical figures such as Schelling, 
Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Peirce have been major reference points in the conversation about 
speculative philosophy from a process perspective, these philosophers have indeed been utilized from a 
contemporary vantage point as well.  One could therefore mention in the same breath as Grant 
contemporary process philosophers (also sometimes called “neo-processists” or “neo-vitalists”) such as 
Steven Shaviro, Adrian Ivakhiv, Jason Hills, Ben Woodard, and Jane Bennett.  These figures are 
connected to speculative realism in ways similar to Grant, but also draw on a variety of traditions and 
resources that go beyond Schelling: American pragmatism, process-relational metaphysics (Whitehead, 
Deleuze, and Peirce), panpsychism, and vitalism have all come into play. 
16 Historical references within debates of the new metaphysics are wide ranging and (mostly) constitute the 
giants of speculative metaphysics in the history of philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, 
Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan, Derrida, Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson, Schelling, and Peirce have all been 
mentioned at some point or another.  Of course speculative philosophy – “metaphysics” proper – is a vast 
field, although it is not uncommon to find the above names consistently addressed. 
17 Collapse III, 306. 
18 Some preliminary discussion of “correlationism” as a concept central to the new metaphysics, 
continental realism, etc. can be found in Josef Moshe, “Correlationism Reconsidered: On the 'Possibility 
of Ignorance' in Meillassoux” Speculations No. 2 (2011):187-206; Raoni Padui, “Realism, Anti-Realism, and 
Materialism,” Angelaki Vol. 16, No. 2 (2011): 89 – 101; and Jussi Backman, “Transcendental Idealism and 
Strong Correlationism,” Phenomenology and the Transcendental, Research Project for “European Rationality in 
the Break from Modernity,” University of Helsinki, Finland (2011). Meillassoux’s After Finitude is considered 
to be the authoritative text on the issue, although “correlationism” is also substantially discussed in his 
interview, “Interview with Quentin Meillassoux,” in Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies, ed. Rick 
Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin (Open Humanities Press, 2012).  Additionally, Meillassoux’s Berlin paper, 
“Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the Meaningless Sign” discusses the issue 
with respect to a new term which he calls “subjectalism” which is explained in this essay. 
19 “Interview with Quentin Meillassoux,” 71. 
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consider a reality devoid of subjectivity or human thinking where it is possible to 
reinstall the ontological power of rationality back into the world itself.  And second, 
the radical form of “realism” under review here seeks to consider reality as it is 
absolutely independent of humans considering it, where it is possible to consider what 
the world was like – or will be like – without human beings (this move is radical if only 
because it positions itself against the dominant 20th century trends of postmodern 
thinking that have stated reality cannot be accessed independently of the conditions 
human beings bring to it).  In both of these one finds the structure of a “correlate” 
between human and world, or between thought and being, each necessarily co-related 
to the other. The question of “correlationism” therefore shall serve as a focal topic in 
exploring how exactly the new metaphysics’ materialism and realism operates.  
II. CORRELATIONISM 
Continental philosophy in the last century has, by and large, suggested that, “we can 
only ever know the correlate between thought and being, but not being itself” [emphasis 
mine].  As Meillassoux explains:  
correlationism in general is an anti-absolutist thesis: one uses the correlate 
“subject-object” (broadly defined) as an instrument of refutation of all 
metaphysics to enforce that we would have access to a modality of the in-itself. 
Instead, for correlationism, we cannot access any form of the in-itself, because we 
are irremediably confined in our relation-to-the-world, without any means to 
verify whether the reality that is given to us corresponds to reality taken in itself, 
independently of our subjective link to it. [emphasis mine]20 
For the correlationist philosopher, "access” to the real is never possible without some 
condition tainting it, where the conditions in question are what human beings bring to 
the table in a “co-relation” with reality.21  This co-relation has taken a number of 
forms: Dasein and Being, consciousness and world, subject and discursive formation, 
text and meaning, and so on.  In each case humans are “embedded” in a world, in a 
text, in a discursive formation, within a conscious appearance, within a series of signs, 
within a relation of some kind.  Stated another way: according to the correlationist, 
there is a necessary “link” between human and world: if there is to be a “world” there 
must be a given presentation of the world in some context or another.  The human 
and world are therefore inextricably tied, and discussing how they are tied has been 
the theme of continental philosophy in the last century.   
20 “Interview with Quentin Meillassoux,” 72. 
21 This is another way of expressing the “correlationist circle.” See Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 2.  
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Epistemologically speaking, correlationism is at once a remark concerning human 
finitude with respect to “knowledge” of an absolutely “outside” world, but more 
directly, it is also a remark about the nature of reality itself; a metaphysical claim.  If a 
metaphysical reality is claimed to be unknowable outside of the conditions of human 
knowledge confronting it, a self-referring circle is established between the world and 
the human consciousness attempting to gain access to it. One cannot get outside of the 
“cage” that human consciousness presents. As Meillassoux explains, 
By correlationism, I thus understand…every philosophy that maintains the 
impossibility of acceding through thought to a being independent of thought….that is 
not always already correlated to an act of thinking….I thus call the 
“correlationist circle”….[A] deadlock that lies in wait [however it is:]…How can 
one claim to think what is when there is no thought, without seeing that this claim 
involves a manifest contradiction?  Correlation itself can be thought in many 
different ways: subject-object, consciousness-given…being-in-the-world, 
language-reference, etc.  But in each case, correlation will be posited as a 
primordial fact rendering null and void any belief in the thinkability of an “in 
itself” transcending all thought.22 
Let us then review by providing a very basic sketch of the fundamental features of 
correlationism, especially with regard to how the new metaphysics’ claims that 
correlationism has operated within 20th century continental philosophy.  This should 
prove helpful in attempting to clarify what exactly is “co-related” in correlationism, 
how each term ought to be understood, and why the new metaphysics finds 
correlationism so problematic.   
III.   TWO FACES OF CORRELATIONISM 
“Correlationism” can be understood in two ways.  First, it may indicate the 
relationship between thought and being.  Second, it may indicate the relationship 
between human (or better, "human subjectivity" or “human experience”) and world.23  
There is a subtle difference here, I think, and in order to understand this subtle 
difference one must parse out the “strong” and “weak” determinations of 
correlationism - between what is involved in the "co-relation" between the activity of 
22 Ibid., 2. 
23 Meillassoux theorizes other possible “worlds” with differing laws of nature, thus other multiple 
“natures.”  But he does not mean “world” as in a phenomenological “life-world.”  Moreover, while 
“nature” is indeed no one “thing,” nor is it a super category (a One), it is not a predicate of worlds, either.  
I am venturing to guess that what Meillassoux means by “reality” (Being) is what a metaphysical naturalist 
would mean by “nature.”  But more importantly with respect to “nature,” concerning the thought and 
logicity of nature – while distinct and not co-relational – both “inhabit” the same absolute.  For, how is it 
that in the progression from Matter, to Life, to Thought, something is retained from the last? 
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thought and the reality of being, or between human thinking/experience and the 
reality of an external world that human thinking/experience is about.  Let me 
elaborate just a few, rough thoughts about what these terms might mean and then 
explain how the thought and being correlation differs from the human and world 
correlation. 
Meillassoux distinguishes between “strong” and “weak” varieties of 
correlationism.24  Essentially, “strong correlationism” absolutizes the subject pole of 
the correlate.  We cannot know “the in-itself…not even in its taking place or logicity”; 
we are “radically confined in our thought.”25  Subject and object collapse into the 
region of phenomenal consciousness, and the result is absolute idealism.  On this 
account Hegel would be a token strong correlationist as would be the tradition of 
idealist or transcendental phenomenology.  “Weak correlationism,” on the other hand, 
admits an “in-itself” apart from thought, as in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, 
where that “something exists in-itself and is thinkable (non-contradictory).”26  
However, for “weak correlationism” the conditions of thought bar the in-itself as it is in-
itself, and the result is a sort of fideism, a “faith” in what is on the outside to know.27  
Again, on Meillassoux’s view, here Kant would be the token weak correlationist as 
would post-Kantian philosophies stating that language or the conditions of society and 
culture bar off the outside world as it is in and of itself.28   
 In spite of these two faces of correlationism, there are yet two more. One 
speculatively moves from or "through" thought and subject, human mind (or 
explaining away those terms given some metaphysical or scientific account) to the 
world absolutely in itself, to a real absolute which is without subject and which is, for the 
intents and purposes of a discussion within contemporary materialist metaphysics, 
wholly material (although that term requires clarification as well, and not all 
contemporary speculative philosophers are materialists in the same way).29  The 
question given this face of correlationism is: given Meillassoux’s requirement of 
“logicity” – presumably conducive to materiality even in its logical feature of being 
non-contradictory and rational – how does one “accede to” an absolutely outside real 
which is devoid of subjectivity?   
24 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 42 and 48ff. 
25 “Interview with Quentin Meillassoux,” 72. 
26 Ibid., 72. 
27 Meillassoux, After Finitude, Chapter 2. 
28 One could, however, argue that post-Kantian postmodern philosophers are “strong” correlationists in 
the sense that one (perhaps stereotypified) feature of postmodernism is that it is relativistic.  For the 
postmodern philosopher, conditions do not “taint” reality or cut us off from reality, but rather are reality. 
29 This “ascension” to being is described in Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 1-2. 
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Meillassoux’s answer to this question defers to a power that establishes the 
principle of non-contradiction as well as the powers of thought.  For him, a necessarily 
contingent ground provides the conditions for things to change over time. This involves 
his concept of “factiality,” a term meaning that things can be otherwise than what they 
are.  Ontologically, factiality is able to establish the epistemological character of what 
humans can know, and can know absolutely  (thus the finite conditions of knowledge are 
removed; i.e. the meaning of the title of his book, After Finitude). Thus, necessarily, all 
created events are contingent.  However, this move also rids Meillassoux’s metaphysics 
of the principle of sufficient reason given how his notion of surcontingency (otherwise called 
Hyper-chaos) operates.  Sucontingency is the very power that creates whatever is but 
always does so in a temporal manner.  Non-contradiction ensures differing advents of 
creation which constitute the movement of time.  This is not to say that there is a 
“reason” for whatever appears in non-contradictory fashion, however.  In other words, 
surcontingency is a necessarily contingent ground where “time” is the creation of events 
where other events were before.30  Meillassoux states that there is no sufficient reason that 
events are one way versus another.  So he is able to hold the principle of non-
contradiction but deny sufficient reason for whatever is created. 
At this stage, my concern is only that there is a danger of equivocation given the 
dual terms of the correlation (and not necessarily Meillassoux’s own response to the 
problem of correlation with his concept of “factiality” or surcontigency).  It may be 
asked of course: may one simply conflate terms on the side of the epistemological 
correlation with those on the ontological side?  Does the activity or power of thought 
necessarily equal subjectivity, let alone human subjectivity?  Is "thought" within such a 
discussion what traditional forms of idealism have meant by it, or, given how “logicity” 
is related to an ontological ground of surcontingency (non-contradictorily but without 
sufficient reason), may it mean something else, perhaps a scientific rationalist 
materialism?   
Meillassoux attempts to answer the charge of an equivocation of ontology and 
epistemology through his critique of “subjectalism,” that is, the knowing subject pole 
of the correlate.  On the one hand, correlationism has survived in skepticism, Kantian 
transcendentalism, and postmodernism: forms of philosophy that deny all access to an 
absolute outside.  Here the outside is always given through a filter of human 
epistemological access, it is always “given to” the human within an array of conditions: 
language, history, culture, structures of power, social conditioning, etc.31  On the other 
30 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 33, 61-70, and in engagement with Hume, 87.  The subtitle of After Finitude is 
“An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency.” 
31 Ibid., 4-6. 
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hand, the correlationist that absolutizes thought, or certain characteristics of thought, 
represents the position which unnecessarily read features of human thought as the 
absolute itself: this is also the “subjectalist.”32  One or more traits of humanity 
subjectivity are read upon reality, and “absolutized across all things.”33  The 
subjectalist thus “hypostasizes the relation we have with things that…withdraw 
continually from the contact we can make with them…The implicit form of this 
withdrawal is given by our relation to things.”34  In other words, so says both the 
correlationist and the subjectalist, in order for things to be, they must be given to the 
human, whether within human thinking or human existing (language, history, discursive 
formation, sign, etc.) This tactic belongs to “the era of Correlation” in that the 
metaphysical real is replaced by the epistemological filter of human experience and 
subjectivity.  
How does the “thought” within the thought and being correlate mix with a 
materialist standpoint, especially if thought is in such a close proximity to subjectivity?  
Meillassoux answers: “We are materialists in so far as we obey two principles: being is 
not thought, [yet] thought can think being.” [emphases mine]35  This suggestion may 
imply that the thought possessed by a subject is itself not exclusively human, yet is fully 
material (or as I would put it, fully natural) and capable of serving as speculative 
instrument.  Therefore, while thought and being are indeed distinct, as Meillassoux 
states, this is not to say that neither are not material, not natural, or are not conducive 
to speculative or scientific thinking.  They are both conducive to the other so that the 
co-relation has been re-constituted within a realist, materialist metaphysics.   
IV. THE CRITIQUE OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
It is arguable that phenomenology has been a staple of 20th-century continental 
philosophy, and given that the new metaphysics seeks to go beyond the correlationism 
of continental philosophy’s past, it is not surprising that the new metaphysics calls into 
question phenomenology as well.  Let me turn toward a critique of phenomenology 
with respect to the above discussion of correlationism, as discussing the relationship 
between a subject or mind and the external world "outside" subject or mind should 
help to define how the new metaphysics differs from traditional correlationist 
philosophies. 
Within the new metaphysics there are several rejections (or modifications) of the 
correlate that can be made when the relationship between co-related terms is 
32 Ibid., 4-6. 
33 Ibid. 4-6. 
34 Ibid., 7. 
35 Meillassoux, “Iteration” 12-13. 
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questioned.  If one is to adopt a materialist metaphysics, then one needs to account for 
what thought is, especially if one wants to cut the correlate between human and world, 
and thus either retain or eliminate subject (thought).36   
Various approaches have been taken here: some keep the subject, the human, and 
retain human practices and activity as a pinnacle in the progression of “worlds” (for 
example, epiphenomenally from matter to life to thought); yet others reach for the 
concept of "ontological parity" - a term initially coined by the American philosopher 
Justus Buchler to mean that no one element of reality is any more "real" than any 
other; and so being no more real than anything else “human” thought or experience is 
decentered from any privileged position in the universe.37  But let us stay with a 
critique of the correlation itself rather than jump ahead to any new formation of the 
correlationist circle just yet. 
From the perspective of the new metaphysics one critique of phenomenology 
seems to be as follows.  Phenomenology is a method which requires appearances given 
to a mind.  Therefore the method is necessarily "representational," focused on a 
"given," and requires the "presence" of what is given to a mind.  This constitutes a 
form of "intentionality."  That is, in order for there to be “mind” something must 
always be given to it if consciousness is intentional (consciousness is always 
consciousness “of” something). In short, traditional notions of phenomenology 
emphasize the reference to, and require relationship between, a conscious mind or 
observer who describes what is "given" and the world "out there" (which is presumably 
the same as what is given in an appearance, hence Husserl’s dictim, “to the things 
themselves.”)  This is a highly simplistic way to understand the character of 
phenomenology, but allow me to continue. 
In this respect, phenomenology simply cannot "get to" the real if “givenness” is a 
necessary feature of intentional consciousness.  Phenomenological observation and 
description references "backward," as it were, the givenness of the real in conscious 
experience rather than the real itself.  Even if the real and appearance to consciousness 
36 The materialism reference is to Žižek’s Less Than Nothing. Still, the notion of “subject” has not been 
clarified with respect to the eliminative materialists versus those who are charged with subjectalism.  In this 
regard, and I've been repeating this, we need to return to Hegel, although my Hegel is Whiteheadian 
rather than Lacanian, and one arrives to such a Hegel by working with Schelling. 
37 Meillassoux maintains that a future Christ-like mediator along with a “God-to-come” (a divine 
inexistence) will inaugurate a “Fourth World of Justice,” a world distinct from the prior worlds of Matter, 
Life, and Thought.  See “L'inexistence divine. Essai sur le Dieu virtuel,” Thèse de doctorat, École 
normale supériuere, 1997.  See also Justus Buchler, Metaphysics of Natural Complexes (New York: SUNY 
Press, 1966), 31 on the notion of “flat ontology,” a concept that Buchler developed nearly fifty years ago in 
the form of a concept titled “ontological parity.”  For specific usages of Meillassouxian terms see the 
forthcoming A Meillassoux Dictionary, ed. Gratton & Ennis (Edinburgh University Press). 
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are “collapsed” (or even if the metaphysical status of the difference between the real 
and appearance is bracketed, as it is in the phenomenological method) they are 
collapsed always into given appearances which are always intended by a conscious 
observer.  And so a correlationist circle develops where one is unable to distinguish 
between descriptions of reality by an intentional someone (the phenomenologist) and the 
world as it really is (there is no “apart” from description).  For the phenomenologist, 
then, reality is just the appearance and its description.  Here, the radical realist 
question concerning the world "without us" becomes impossible to ask; it never makes 
it to the table given that phenomenology is necessarily an intentional, human-
consciousness-centered, descriptive method.  Suddenly, everything becomes 
appearances to consciousness, always a description of appearances from a correlated point 
of view.  As Ray Brassier summarizes, 
Indeed, the founding axiom of phenomenology (Husserl’s ‘principle of 
principles’) could be simply stated as: appearances can only be understood in 
their own terms. But what are ‘their own terms’? Precisely the terms concomitant 
with the first-person phenomenological point of view.38  
On this view, phenomenology is claimed to be descriptive reportage, and from the 
standpoint of continental philosophy in the last century, what is not description and 
from some vantage point?  It was Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida who emphasized 
the finite beginning point of the subject, a conditioned vantage point: whether a being 
thrown into a world, a conscious representation, a sign, text, or embodied culture, 
some form of translated, mediated embodiment whose beginning point was always already a 
conditioned human awareness, a conditioned human situation.  To cinch the point here in 
so far as the phenomenological method is specifically concerned: it seems that because 
phenomenology is essentially a descriptive reportage it is guilty as charged for 
requiring a correlated mind or observer to 1.) be there for the data to enter and suffer 
description, and 2.) to "do" the describing, without which there would be no "world."  
Human and world are tied in a mutually informing relationship where there cannot be 
one without the other.   
To review: the history of correlationism, as we have stated, asserts that reality is 
conditioned always by something: by the faculties of a mind, by language or discursive 
formations, by signs, by appearances, by power structures, by the body - where the 
point is not to transcend these conditions but to account for how these conditions 
shape subjective human experience.  The new metaphysics critiques this point of view 
from a realist, materialist standpoint that reduces human experience to its (non-
exclusively human) power of rational thought within a (largely indifferent) contingent 
38 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, 27. 
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material universe.  This power of speculation is enabled by the principle of non-
contradiction as expressed within the temporal creative nature of surcontingency.  Or 
to repeat Meillassoux from above, “being is not thought yet thought can think being.” 
I would like to close this essay by articulating what might be problematic about the 
new metaphysics’ materialism and realism and its critique of correlationism.  A 
pressing problem seems to be in how some strands of the new metaphysics the human 
being is decentred nearly entirely, which for the sake of scientific knowledge in a 
context of metaphysical realism may sense if we are concerned with the world as it 
was, is, or will be apart from the human. Or from another viewpoint, at the very least, 
ecologically speaking, the new metaphysics questions how a new methodological 
perspective might place human experience along side nonhuman experience, where 
each is placed on an equal footing using Buchler’s principle of ontological parity.   
But, if the human and human conditions are to be set to the background rather 
than allowed to inhabit the foreground, as they have been within the history of 
correlationism, then the very important question of the “value” of experience certainly 
comes to the fore.  Here there appears to be two options in confronting this problem of 
value: either drop human experience as a region of concern within one’s materialist 
metaphysics and then decide to drop value altogether (opting for a radical naturalism 
and scientific realism), or, situate axiologically experience, objective value, within one’s 
materialist metaphysics and include an account of experience had by the nonhuman 
other (a “noncorrelationist” phenomenology that is equally materialist and realist).  In 
order to pursue either option one seems to be forced to justify a particular value 
judgment regarding the very nature of value itself. 
With respect to the first option, the consequences may be scientistic: a materialist 
approach that champions reason may disregard subjective human experience and 
value in such a way that pernicious nihilism is the result.  Further, this result (as it 
vaguely has in the work of Meillassoux, for example) draws upon the findings of 
scientific data to challenge any supposed worth of or meaning within the universe: 
including the presumed importance that human beings took for themselves vis-à-vis an 
absolutely indifferent cosmos.39  This would be a “risk” mainly insofar as the value of 
39 See Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the Meaningless Sign.”  
An interesting corollary becomes apparent here. If the human and human conditions are to be set into the 
background so that others may enter the foreground, or if the truth simply is that reality is indifferent to 
whatever is human or indeed living, then by what measure of value, or minimally, by what standard of 
judgment, do we deem the truth of a valueless for all of life, or to a hopelessness and pessimism applicable 
to all of the universe – and actively endorse such a cosmic pessimism?  Ironically, perhaps, it is by through 
the power of rationality. But the new metaphysics has yet to engage the normative standards, or lack 
thereof, of rationality.   
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human rights, the importance of correlated conditions such as gender, race, and class, 
take back seat to the championing of an intrinsically indifferent, meaningless, material 
universe.  A cosmic pessimism regarding an indifferent material universe may lack 
normative justification on the premise that there would be no worth to claiming the 
value of that perspective over any other perspective, and a relativism would ensue 
defeating the realist pretension of the scientific materialist judgments involved.40   
The consequences for the second option, that experiences of value had by others 
ought to be brought up to an equal level of importance that we human beings have 
thought ourselves to occupy alone, certainly admits value and the creation, expression, 
and apprehension of value.  But this may result either in a value monism - an objective 
value axiology that levels an “absolutist” conception of univocal value where the 
individuality and specificity of value-perspectives in the particular is challenged.  Or, it 
may result in an all-too-radical value pluralism that winds up being a relativistic 
perspectivalism of competing values where each perspective exists simply for itself, 
making alliances and waging war on others without the possibility of any sustainable 
unity or coherence. 
Here I would like to state that looking in particular at the risk involved with the first 
option (dropping value and meaning as legitimate regions of scientific concern within a 
materialist metaphysics, pace Meillassoux and Brassier) may help to refine the purpose 
of this essay in particular, that is, looking at how the new metaphysics’ rejection of 
correlationism brings to light new questions concerning the place of reason and 
speculation, metaphysics, as a valid philosophical instrument within the 21st century – 
especially as posed against the correlationist methods of the 20th century.  As for the 
new metaphysics in its ethical, political, and social dimensions – that is, questions 
concerning value and normativity vis-à-vis the new metaphysics, the second option has 
been, by and large, an unpursued avenue of inquiry.41 
40 This would be nihilism pushed through to its worst extreme, and the challenge would be to balance the 
legitimacy of scientific claims with the value of pessimistic “anti-value” claims.    
41 I should qualify this statement: certain camps of the new metaphysics have been silent concerning ethical, 
social, and political questions.  Regarding “speculative materialism” (Meillassoux) or Brassier’s 
“Prometheanism” (also called “transcendental nihilism”), there has been little response to the problematic 
of nihilism, as for them, nihilism is not a problem from within a scientific, rational viewpoint.  See 
Brassier’s Nihil Unbound, for example.  On the other hand, the “processualists” mentioned above, most 
notably Jane Bennett and William Connolly, have been taken to task for lacking a standard or program 
within which their vital and indeed, political, ontologies to operate.  See Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter: A 
Political Ontology of Things (NC: Duke University Press, 2010) and William Connolly, A World of Becoming 
(NC: Duke University Press, 2011).  It has become apparent that an axiological line can be drawn between 
the options that I have outlined above – drop and disregard value and experience, or admit it into one’s 
ontology.  Doing the latter may necessarily politicize one’s ontology where, without a standard or 
program of measure and judgment, we are lead back into a correlationist perspectivalism and subjectalism 
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V. CONCLUSION: THE ENLIGHTENED TRUTH - OF NIHILISM? 
Correlationist philosophy states that the world requires the human either for 
knowledge or for its very being.  But to this speculative philosophy and the new 
metaphysics says "No."  There is at first a certain shock or horror that the universe can 
gladly go on without us, a reaction to the “cosmicism” in play; but then an enlightened 
moment of Stoic truth rears its head.  In trade for phenomenology, existentialism, 
hermeneutics, or semiotics, methods such as ontology understood as mathematics or 
set-theory (emphasizing the mathematizable powers of the real), or neurobiology 
(emphasizing the material distribution of powers) become preferred methods of choice 
due to their non-human referential capacity.  It is along these lines that figures such as 
Brassier and Meillassoux champion the rational powers of science, and why Malabou 
champions the advances of neurobiology.  The “realism” to this new metaphysics 
makes more sense, then, in a scientific context.  What value, if any, is there to this 
scientific perspective?   
On the view of these figures an absolutely outside is indeed entirely conducive to 
the power of thought, to reason, which, while not exclusively human, knits with the 
reasoning of human beings which the outside itself has produced, even if contingently 
and without reason.  In this way Brassier’s own criticisms of correlationism knit with a 
philosophical naturalism, a scientific realism and “transcendental nihilism,” that at 
once constitutes a scientific but also rational outlook.  And Meillassoux’s own 
“speculative materialism” is at once rationalist and materialist, friendly to the powers 
of the mathematizable, yet recognizing the implicit dynamical powers of an ancient 
material “outside,” the “arche-fossil.”  It too befriends the sciences and places trust in 
the speculative power of reason.   
There is often a dark or apocalyptic tone associated with 21st century metaphysics, 
especially those speculative philosophers who follow Brassier or Meillassoux. Is it 
possible that such a tone might actually invite more understanding, given the nature of 
of Nietzschean competing values.  Bennett and Connolly, as well as others who have attempted to address 
the political within their new metaphysics, have also been scathingly attacked. See the recent blog post by 
Christian Thorne titled, “To the Political Ontologists:: http://sites.williams.edu/cthorne/articles/to-the-
political-ontologists/ (retrieved July 24, 2013).  Two other texts relevant to this debate are New Materialisms: 
Ontology, Agency, Politics ed. Cool & Frost (NC: Duke University Press, 2010) and Religion, Politics, and the 
Earth ed. Crockett and Robbins (Palgrave Macmillion, 2012).  One can easily see the axiological line 
drawn between these sorts of materialism and the sorts of materialisms proposed by Brassier and 
Meillassoux.  Of course, in addition to the question concerning value as it operates within ethics and 
politics from a materialist standpoint, there is the question of value operating within theological and 
religious frameworks appropriated from the new materialist standpoint as well.  Here “immanental” 
materialist theologies and empirical theologies may be constructed and addressed.  See Leon 
Niemoczynski, “Speculating God: Meillassoux’s Divine Inexistence,” The Future of Continental Philosophy of 
Religion, ed. Clayton Crockett, Keith Putt, and Jeffrey Robbins (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2014).   
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speculation itself?  I have hinted to this above, given this section’s title, “The 
Enlightened Truth” and its subtitle, “Nihilism?,” and answer in the affirmative.   
First, Brassier, 
[N]ihilism is... the unavoidable corollary of the realist conviction that there is a 
mind-independent reality, which, despite the presumptions of human narcissism, 
is indifferent to our existence and oblivious to the ‘values’ and ‘meanings’ which 
we would drape over it in order to make it more hospitable.... Nihilism is not an 
existential quandary but a speculative opportunity [emphasis mine].42 
And, 
Like Nietzsche, I think nihilism is a consequence of the ‘will to truth’. But unlike 
Nietzsche, I do not think nihilism culminates in the claim that there is no truth. 
Nietzsche conflated truth with meaning, and concluded that since the latter is 
always a result of human artifice, the former is nothing but a matter of 
convention. However, once truth is dismissed, all that remains is the difference 
between empowering and disempowering fictions, where ‘life’ is the fundamental 
source of empowerment and the ultimate arbiter of the difference between life-
enhancing and life-depreciating fictions. Since the abandonment of truth 
undermines the reason for relinquishing illusion, it ends up licensing the 
concoction of further fictional narratives, the only requirement for which is that 
they prove to be ‘life-enhancing’.  
I consider myself a nihilist precisely to the extent that I refuse this Nietzschean 
solution and continue to believe in the difference between truth and falsity, 
reality and appearance. In other words, I am a nihilist precisely because I still 
believe in truth, unlike those whose triumph over nihilism is won at the cost of 
sacrificing truth. I think that it is possible to understand the meaninglessness of 
existence, and that this capacity to understand meaning as a regional or bounded 
phenomenon marks a fundamental progress in cognition.43 
Truth, therefore, as exposed by the power of reason, becomes paramount.  Rather 
than sliding into the relativistic existential nihilisms of the past century, the new 
metaphysics faces an indifferent universe and pushes through it, via reason, to the 
meaninglessness (and truth) of existence. Meillassoux, likewise, notes that, “I do not do 
metaphysics, I do speculation.  I am a resolute anti-metaphysician precisely in so far as 
I speculate on the absolute.[emphasis mine]”44  At this point an equally resolute Stoic 
response is in order, and as a realism concerning the absolute, nothing less would be 
appropriate.   
42 Brassier, Nihil Unbound, xi. 
43 Brassier, Kronos, http://www.kronos.org.pl/index.php?23151,896 
44 Meillassoux, “Iteration,” 17. 
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In these quotes lies a dormant power, I think.  This is the dormant power of 
speculation as metaphysical instrument.  Pragmatically, an “understanding” of the 
truth and the fact that one may “speculate on the absolute” seems to be the goal of this 
instrument.  A new form of knowledge, one that is non-correlational and of “the 
absolutely outside,” the real itself, appears to be the answer. For those who have been 
trained in the continental tradition, with its emphasis on divulging conditions that 
human beings specifically bring to the table; that is, for those who have learned the 
major figures of the tradition of continental philosophy until this century (Heidegger, 
Husserl, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, etc.), metaphysical truth has always been human-
dependent and context dependent.  But I believe that there is a certain form of 
liberation from a context-dependent view of the truth, one that is found in the 
instrument of speculative philosophy, and one that is present in that dormant power to 
go “beyond” the subjective link with the absolute.  Indeed, whether the absolute itself 
contains a rational power, a power of rational circumscription, or whether the absolute 
itself is entirely devoid of rationality (or the power which makes for and animates 
rationality – i.e. concepts) is still a debate to be had.  But the new metaphysics’ view of 
truth and reality certainly advances “beyond” continental philosophy’s aversion to 
metaphysics nonetheless.  In the use of the instrument of speculative philosophy there 
is a freedom from the longstanding tradition of imprisoned speculation.  What is 
gained in the use of this instrument is not only an understanding of a new form of 
metaphysical knowledge, but a freedom from narcissism, the idea that human thought 
is somehow required within the edifice of reality and knowledge that is the world.   
My challenge here has been to frame what "the new metaphysics," or “the new 
materialism” or “the new realism” has fundamentally concerned itself with in the past 
few years.  There is no clear cut answer, but I have ventured to state that an 
engagement with correlationism may be a way to start the conversation, especially 
concerning how 21st century philosophy differs from the last century's philosophy.  In 
the end, it is easier to claim that, indeed, there has been a “shift” in contemporary 
continental philosophy, in contemporary metaphysical thinking, and that continental 
materialism and realism are offering thought provoking critiques of canonical figures 
and traditions prior to it.  No one can predict what the consequences of this shift in 
continental philosophy will be, but the vanguard of philosophy must confront this new 
“spirit” of speculation, this new way of thinking.  And so the question: How will 
philosophers respond to the challenge? 
Only time shall tell. 
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